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Abstract 
What issues matter when people judge whether it is 
morally objectionable for healthy people to use 
cognitive-enhancing (CE) drugs? Two studies 
surveyed university students regarding the 
following concerns: Health, competitive fairness, 
distributive fairness, peer pressure, naturalness and 
dosage form. Participants condemned CE drug use 
when there were long-term negative effects on 
health, and when CE drug use was seen to provide 
an unfair advantage to someone in an exam 
situation while others were not taking the drugs. 
Further, participants judged CE drug use more 
harshly if the drugs were artificial rather than 
natural, and if they were in the form of an injection 
rather than a pill, suggesting that moral intuitions 
relating to purity also influence opinions on CE 
drugs. Our results shed light on perceptions of CE 
drug use in a segment of the public – students in a 
highly competitive university context – that has 
much to gain or lose from changes in CE drug use 
policy. 
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 Cognitive-enhancing (CE) drugs were 
originally developed to treat cognitive disabilities 
such as narcolepsy, Alzheimer’s disease or attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (Husain & Mehta, 
2011; Maher, 2008). Increasingly, however, healthy 
individuals use CE drugs such as modafinil (e.g. 
Provigil®) and methylphenidate (e.g. Ritalin®) to 
improve cognitive functions including attention and 
working memory (Husain & Mehta, 2011; Maher, 
2008; Sahakian & Morein-Zamir, 2007). For 
example, in a study of 119 U.S. colleges, up to 25% 
of healthy students reported CE drug use (McCabe, 
Knight, Teter, & Wechsler, 2005). Survey results 
(Maher, 2008; Sahakian & Morein-Zamir, 2007), as 
well as debates in the relevant literature (e.g. Greely 
et al., 2008; Harris & Chatterjee, 2009; Mehlman, 
2004), show that views on CE drugs1 are highly 
polarized, with some noting the potential benefits of 
enhancing cognitive ability to both individuals and 
society, while others warning of the dangers. The 
present research aimed to explore the factors 
underlying judgments about healthy individuals’ 
use of CE drugs. 
 Discussions relating to neuroethics, and in 
parallel, to doping in competitive sports, have 
identified several factors playing a role in people’s 
judgments about the acceptability of chemically 
enhancing people’s natural abilities. A key 
consideration is health, because little is known 
about possible negative side-effects of CE drugs, 
especially in the long-term (Chatterjee, 2004; 2006; 
Harris & Chatterjee, 2009; Maher, 2008; Sahakian 
& Morein-Zamir, 2007). Second, distributive 
fairness describes the concern that people with 
resources have an unfair competitive advantage 
over those without (Cakic, 2009; Greely et al., 2008; 
Maher, 2008; Sahakian & Morein-Zamir, 2007). 
Third, competitive fairness relates to normative 
beliefs about the appropriateness of having to take 
the drugs in order to remain competitive (Greely et 
al., 2008; Maher, 2008; Petróczi & Aidman, 2008; 
Petróczi & Aidman, 2009; Wiefferink et al., 2008). 
Fourth, discussions of biotechnological advances 
have questioned the naturalness of new 
technologies, namely whether they are derived from 
artificial or “natural” sources (Kass, 2003; Sagoff, 
2001; Watts, 2000). Fifth, related to naturalness is 
dosage form (Sahakian & Morein-Zamir, 2007), 
Scheske & Schnall (in press): The Ethics of ‘Smart Drugs’    2 
that is, the manner in which drugs are administered 
(e.g. pill or injection).  
Although some of these concerns (e.g., 
health), are highly appropriate, other concerns (e.g., 
naturalness or dosage form) are more difficult to 
explain. Such seemingly “irrational” considerations, 
however, are in line with recent moral 
psychological theory. Moving away from rationalist 
approaches (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983), moral 
psychologists have started to emphasize the 
contribution of emotions and other non-rational 
processes to moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). In his 
social intuitionist model, Haidt argues that people 
often make quick, automatic moral judgments, even 
if they cannot provide a valid reason for why 
something is wrong. Thus, such judgments are 
based primarily on moral intuitions, and involve 
affective evaluations of situations and events (Haidt, 
2001; Haidt & Björklund, 2008). Similarly, Maio 
and Olson (1998) suggested in their values-as-
truisms hypothesis that people’s values often lack 
cognitive support, and instead are primarily guided 
by emotion.  
 We believe that on some level, people 
consider CE drugs a moral issue that elicits 
emotional responses. Thus, people might not only 
care about objectively problematic aspects of CE 
drugs, but also consider issues that have no rational 
basis. In other words, some concerns related to CE 
drugs are justified, but others might follow 
intuitions, and in that sense be akin to “moral 
dumbfounding” effects (Haidt, 2001), for which 
people simply state that a behavior is wrong in the 
absence of any supporting evidence.  
In particular, concerns about the naturalness 
of CE drugs may follow a moral intuition rather 
than defensible reasons. A widespread belief is that 
natural products are healthier than artificial ones 
(Britten, 1994; Britten, Ukoumunne & Boulton, 
2002; Giveon, 2004; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 
1999; Sagoff, 2001; Verhoog, Matze, van Bueren, 
& Baars, 2003). For example, Giveon (2004) found 
that more than half of respondents believed that 
“natural” drugs have no negative side-effects 
“because they are natural (p. 10).” The concern for 
naturalness may relate to people’s desire to keep the 
body pure and clean. Feelings of disgust serve an 
adaptive function in this context, because they 
protect the body from potential contamination, and 
people often report disgust at violations of the 
sanctity of the human body (Rozin, Haidt & 
McCauley, 2008). Disgust, however, is not just a 
response to offensive objects, but also to offensive 
behaviors, namely moral transgressions (Rozin et al., 
1999; 2008), and physical and moral disgust can 
become conflated. For example, inductions of 
physical disgust make people’s moral judgments 
more severe (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; 
Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Ugazio, Lamm, & 
Singer, 2011), whereas inductions of physical purity 
make moral judgments less severe (Schnall, Benton, 
& Harvey, 2008).  
Similarly, non-rational intuitions may be 
behind concerns about how CE drugs are 
administered, because perceived efficacy and 
overall preferences differ across dosage forms 
(Vallance, 2006). For instance, drug attributes such 
as color (de Craen, Roos, de Vries & Kleijnen, 1996) 
or whether drugs are tablets or capsules (Hussain, 
1972) influence people’s perception of drug 
efficacy. Further, a drug’s route of administration2 
matters: Although patients prefer orally 
administered drugs over injections (Fallowfield et 
al., 2006; Atkinson et al., 2004), the latter are 
perceived as more effective. Such effects might be 
due to the fact that injections, while invasive and 
unpleasant, might be seen as a more significant 
treatment compared to other dosage forms; related 
concerns might play a role when people consider 
the extent to which it is acceptable to chemically 
alter healthy people’s natural abilities.  
 
The Current Research 
Discussions of CE drug use have been 
largely theoretical, and limited to academic circles, 
but it is unknown what the general public thinks of 
such drugs, and in particular, people for whom they 
may be highly salient. We conducted two studies to 
determine whether moral concerns about CE drugs 
reflect opinions in the scientific literature. Further, 
we were interested in people’s “gut feelings” about 
CE drugs, based on the social intuitionist model of 
moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). We surveyed 
students at a very competitive British university, 
where CE drug use is a highly relevant topic.  
 The first study explored whether health, 
distributive and competitive fairness, naturalness 
and dosage form are concerns when making 
judgments about the use of CE drugs by healthy 
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people. Extremity of the moral transgression was 
varied with respect to specific moral concerns, and 
we expected that if a given concern was relevant, 
moral judgments would vary accordingly. More 
specifically, we expected participants to judge the 
use of CE drugs as more wrong if involving 
negative side-effects on health, if they created 
distributive and competitive unfairness, if 
originating from an unnatural source, and for 
invasive dosage forms.  
 
Study 1 
 
Method 
 Participants. Fifty-one students (44 
undergraduates; 7 graduates) from the University of 
Cambridge (25 female; mean age: 20.56 years, SD 
= 2.26) participated. One participant’s data were 
excluded due to failure to follow instructions.  
 Procedure. Students were approached on 
campus and asked to complete a brief survey. 
 Materials. Following a brief definition of 
cognitive-enhancing drugs, participants received 
questions in the following format: “What do you 
think of healthy people using cognitive-enhancing 
drugs to increase mental performance if [insert 
moral concern]?” Participants gave their answers on 
a 10-point scale (adopted from Schnall et al., 2008), 
labeled from 0 (“perfectly OK”), 3 (“somewhat 
wrong”), 6 (“very wrong”) to 9 (“extremely 
wrong”). Participants first made a global judgment 
of CE drug use that consisted only of the baseline 
question. Then, for each of the five moral concerns, 
three questions varied the extremity of the situation. 
Each participant answered all 16 questions. 
Health: No negative side-effects on health; 
temporary negative side-effects on health; long-
term negative side-effects on health. 
Distributive Fairness: Most people could 
afford to buy the drugs; only some people could 
afford to buy the drugs; only very few people could 
afford to buy the drugs. 
Competitive Fairness: The question 
specified a healthy person on a university course 
taking CE drugs to enhance exam performance, 
although the situation varied: either most of the 
other people in that course were taking the drugs, 
some of the other people in that course were taking 
the drugs, or none of the other people in that course 
were taking the drugs. 
Dosage Form: Drug as additive to tea or 
coffee; drug as pill; drug as injection. 
Naturalness: Drugs sold by organic whole 
foods store; drugs sold by supermarket; drugs sold 
in pharmacies. 
 
Results 
 On the global item, participants judged the 
use of CE drugs to be between “somewhat” and 
“very” wrong (M = 4.54, SD = 2.67), suggesting a 
generally negative view toward CE drug use. We 
then analyzed each of the five concerns with 
repeated-measures ANOVAs, with extremity as 
repeated factor (see Table 1 for means). Bonferroni 
post-hoc tests followed up on significant main 
effects. 
 Health. Judgments involving health 
consequences varied depending on extremity, F(2, 
98) = 52.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .52. There was a linear 
trend, F(1, 49) = 62.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .56, with CE 
drug use considered most wrong if involving long-
term negative side-effects, less wrong with 
temporary negative side-effects and least wrong 
with no negative side-effects. Interestingly, 
however, the mean for the latter item indicated that 
even in the absence of any negative health effects, 
CE drug use was judged somewhat wrong, rather 
than being perfectly acceptable. 
 Distributive fairness. Judgments involving 
distributive fairness differed as a function of 
extremity, F(2, 98) = 47.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .49. CE 
drug use was rated most wrong if very few people 
could afford them, less wrong if some people could 
afford them, and least wrong if most people could 
afford them, illustrated by a linear trend, F(1, 49) = 
54.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .53.  
 Competitive fairness. Judgments for the 
competitive fairness of CE drugs were influenced 
by extremity, F(2, 98) = 26.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .35. 
A linear trend indicated that the use of CE drugs for 
an exam was considered most wrong if no other 
people were taking them, less wrong if some other 
people were taking them, and least wrong if most 
other people were taking them, F(1, 49) = 34.83, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .42.  
 Dosage form. Participants also cared about 
the dosage form through which CE drugs are 
administered, F(2, 98) = 19.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. 
Follow-up comparisons showed that although there 
was no significant difference between judgments of 
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CE drugs when added to tea or coffee compared to a 
pill, injections were rated more negatively than 
those two dosage forms, ps < .001.  
 Naturalness. Source of the drugs, whether 
natural or not, did not matter, F(2, 98) = 2.15, p 
= .12, ηp2 = .04. 
 
Discussion 
 People overall disapproved of CE drug use, 
as shown by the results of the global judgment item. 
This was also reflected in the answers to the more 
specific moral scenarios: Average moral judgments 
never came close to indicating CE drug use to be 
“perfectly OK.” 
 Study 1 confirmed that students at a highly 
competitive university are concerned with the health, 
distributive fairness and competitive fairness moral 
aspects of CE drug use. For the health concern, the 
least severe moral judgments were made for the 
scenario with no negative side-effects on health, 
more severe for temporary side-effects, and most 
severe for long-term negative side-effects of CE 
drugs. This last item showed the highest mean 
condemnation across all items in the survey. Further, 
the fewer people could afford CE drugs, i.e. 
increasing distributive unfairness, the more wrong 
CE drug use was judged to be. Participants also met 
increased competitive unfairness with increasing 
condemnation: CE drug use was rated to be more 
wrong if there were fewer other people in an exam 
situation taking the drugs than in a situation where 
most others were taking the drugs.  
 In addition to the concerns above, which can 
be considered serious factors that require careful 
rational analyses, we also found that seemingly 
irrelevant considerations play a role when assessing 
the acceptability of CE drug use: Injections were 
judged to be more wrong than pills, or additives to 
drinks, in line with earlier findings that injections 
are perceived as more powerful treatments 
(Fallowfield et al., 2006; Atkinson et al., 2004).  
 Unexpectedly, drug source did not matter: 
CE drugs from organic whole foods stores, 
supermarkets or pharmacies were given equal moral 
ratings. Perhaps place of purchase did not reveal 
much about the drugs’ makeup, i.e. did not create 
clear artificial vs. natural distinctions. The 
operationalization for naturalness was therefore not 
ideal, and this and other questions were examined 
further in a follow-up study.  
Study 2 
 A second study aimed to replicate the 
findings from Study 1 regarding people’s concerns 
about health, competitive fairness, and distributive 
fairness, and to elaborate on the effects of 
naturalness and dosage form. In addition, we 
differentiated between the concepts of competitive 
fairness and peer pressure, which in the first study 
were treated as a single construct. Competitive 
fairness relates to professional or academic goal 
attainment, whereas peer pressure results from 
people’s need to belong to a social group, and 
causes them to conform to the explicit and implicit 
social norms of that group (Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004). The concern regarding CE drugs might 
therefore involve the fear that if many people in 
one’s social circle were taking the drugs, one would 
also have to take them to fit in. 
 As in Study 1, we expected that CE drug use 
would be judged as more wrong with negative side-
effects on health and if taking them resulted in 
competitive or distributive unfairness. We also 
explored whether competitive fairness and peer 
pressure would interact such that it would matter 
whether the other people taking the drugs (or not) 
were friends or competitors. Such an interaction 
would reveal the relative importance of competitive 
fairness and peer pressure for our population. 
Further, the measure of naturalness was altered to 
reflect more directly the difference between 
artificial and natural CE drugs. We further tested for 
an interaction between dosage form and naturalness, 
because both factors relate to the physical nature of 
the drug itself. Thus, with the addition of peer 
pressure, we examined six distinct moral concerns 
related to CE drug use: health, competitive fairness, 
distributive fairness, peer pressure, naturalness and 
dosage form.  
 We also addressed another limitation of 
Study 1: it may have produced carry-over effects 
because participants received all three variations of 
a question. Instead, Study 2 used a between-subjects 
design, and each participant only received one of 12 
possible questions. Another possible confound was 
that the 10-point scale had featured the word 
“wrong” three times, which possibly caused a 
negative priming effect. The scale was therefore 
shortened, and had no intermittent labels.  
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Method 
 Participants. 306 students (245 
undergraduates, 39 graduates, 1 “other”) from the 
University of Cambridge (157 female; mean age: 
20.74 years, SD = 2.26) participated.  
Procedure. Students were approached on 
campus and asked to complete a brief survey. 
 Materials. The baseline question was: 
“What do you think of healthy people using 
cognitive-enhancing drugs in order to increase their 
mental performance if the drugs were [insert moral 
concern]?” For each of the six concerns, two 
variations of the baseline question manipulated 
extremity, resulting in 12 different conditions. 
Participants responded to questions using a 6-point 
scale, labeled from 0 “perfectly OK” to 5 
“extremely wrong.”. 
 Health; Distributive Fairness. The two 
most extreme items of Study 1 were retained. 
 Competitive Fairness and Peer Pressure. 
We combined the items for competitive fairness and 
peer pressure, allowing testing for an interaction 
effect between the variables. The conditions varied 
whether other people took the drugs or not, and 
whether these were friends or competitors in an 
exam situation. Four items resulted, of which each 
participant answered only one: “what do you think 
of a healthy university student taking cognitive-
enhancing drugs to enhance their exam performance 
if none of the other students in that course were 
taking the drugs?”, “what do you think of a healthy 
university student taking cognitive-enhancing drugs 
to enhance their exam performance if all of the 
other students in that course were taking the drugs?”, 
“what do you think of a healthy person using 
cognitive-enhancing drugs in order to increase their 
mental performance if all of their friends were 
taking the drugs?” and “ what do you think of a 
healthy person using cognitive-enhancing drugs in 
order to increase their mental performance if none 
of their friends were taking the drugs?” 
 Naturalness and Dosage Form. For 
naturalness we distinguished between herbal and 
artificial, crossed with dosage form of drink 
additive and injection. Items were: Drug is herbal 
extract administered using injection; drug is herbal 
extract contained in drink; drug is created 
artificially and administered using injection; drugs 
is created artificially and contained in drink.  
Results 
  Health. As expected, participants rated the 
use of CE drugs as significantly more wrong when 
involving long-term negative side-effects, rather 
than no negative side-effects, t(50) = 2.56, p < .007, 
r = .34 (see Table 2 for means).  
 Distributive fairness. Unexpectedly, ratings 
did not differ between only few people, or most 
people being able to afford them, t(50) = 0.87, p 
< .20, r = .12.  
 Competitive fairness and peer pressure. A 
two-way ANOVA showed no significant main 
effects of either peer pressure, F(1, 100) = 2.54, p 
= .11, ηp2 = .03, or competitive fairness, F(1, 100) = 
0.04, p = .85, ηp2 = .00 (see Figure 1 for means). 
However, there was an interaction effect, F(1, 100) 
= 4.97, p = .03, ηp2 = .05. A post-hoc Bonferroni 
test showed that participants considered it more 
wrong for a person to take CE drugs when no other 
competitors were taking the drugs, compared to no 
other friends, p < .05. 
 Naturalness and dosage form. Significant 
main effects for both naturalness and dosage form 
emerged, as shown by a two-way independent 
ANOVA (see Figure 2 for means). CE drug use was 
considered more wrong if drugs were artificial 
rather than herbal, F(1, 94) = 7.75, p = .006, ηp2 
= .08, and if they were in the form of an injection 
rather than a drink, F(1, 94) = 4.93, p = .03, ηp2 
= .05. The two variables did not interact, F(1, 94) = 
0.79, p = .38, ηp2 = .01, suggesting that judgment of 
dosage form did not depend on the type of drug.  
 
Discussion 
 Consistent with the results from Study 1, 
concerns for health were again found to matter to 
participants, with the highest condemnation for 
assumed long-term health risks. This supports our 
expectation that health is an important factor in 
people’s moral judgments of CE drug use (see also 
Maher, 2008). Interestingly, however, distributive 
fairness did not matter, contrary to the results of 
Study 1. One possible reason for this is that the 
format of Study 1 might have led participants to 
give socially desirable responses, and indicate 
greater concerns for justice when explicitly 
contrasting people who can afford certain drugs 
with people who cannot. In contrast, Study 2 did not 
allow such a comparison because each participant 
only received one format of the question.  
The results of combining competitive 
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fairness and peer pressure suggested that if no 
others were using CE drugs in a given context, it 
was considered more wrong if the individual using 
them did so in a competitive situation compared to 
in a context with friends. Thus, university students 
in our sample were especially concerned about the 
unfair advantage a drug might confer to an 
individual in an exam situation where other students 
do not use such drugs, which is in line with 
suggestions in the literature (e.g. Cakic, 2009). 
Further, as expected, dosage form and 
naturalness were both relevant: Participants 
considered CE drug use to be more wrong if the 
drugs were artificial rather than herbal (see also 
Britten, 1994; Britten et al., 2002; Giveon, 2004). 
Dosage form was also found to be relevant, with the 
more invasive form, an injection, condemned more 
strongly than the less invasive form (see also 
Atkinson et al., 2004; Fallowfield et al., 2006). 
Findings from these latter two concerns suggest that 
in addition to objectively valid concerns, 
condemnation of CE drugs also involves moral 
intuitions (Haidt, 2001) that are more difficult to 
justify on completely rational grounds.  
 
General Discussion 
 Findings from two studies demonstrated that 
a number of factors matter to university students’ 
opinion on the use of CE drugs. Across all the 
factors we tested, it is noteworthy that even when 
aggregate responses were near the middle of our 
moral judgment scales, they always leaned towards 
the negative, and people never came close to 
judging CE drug use as being “perfectly OK”. But 
not all factors mattered equally; among the most 
important concerns were dangers to health, and the 
competitive advantage provided to an individual 
using the drugs in examination situations in which 
other people do not use them. Given that our 
participants were students at a highly competitive 
university, it comes as no surprise that the thought 
of some students performing better due to CE drugs 
would be highly disconcerting. These findings are 
consistent with the issues raised in the scientific 
discussions of CE drug use (e.g. Cakic, 2009; 
Greely et al., 2008).   
In contrast to the scientific discourse, 
however, distributive fairness, in other words, equal 
access to the drugs, was less of a concern to 
participants in our sample. Students only considered 
unequal access problematic when this issue was 
made very salient in the survey, in which case their 
responses might have reflected a hesitation to 
openly endorse unfair access. Further, the relative 
lack of concern for distributive fairness might be 
due to the fact that many participants in our sample 
may have come from a privileged socio-economic 
background for which access issues appear less 
relevant.  
 Somewhat surprisingly, given the discussion 
in the literature (Maher, 2008), peer pressure was 
not found to be a central relevant moral concern to 
our participants. We should caution that our sample 
sizes were limited, so with greater samples we 
might have obtained a statistically significant effect. 
Nevertheless, when examining effect sizes, the 
magnitude of effect was comparatively small for 
peer pressure, relative to other concerns, such as 
health.  
 As noted earlier, we believe that judgments 
about CE drugs are on a fundamental level moral 
judgments, and as such, can be influenced by valid, 
rational considerations, but also by rather emotional, 
and possibly irrational considerations (Haidt, 2001). 
For example, although it is difficult to provide a 
rational argument for why it should matter whether 
CE drugs were derived from a natural or synthetic 
source, it did matter to our participants: In Study 2, 
participants rated the use of herbal CE drugs as less 
wrong than the use of artificial CE drugs. This is 
consistent with research showing that people 
believe that natural drugs have fewer negative side-
effects than artificial drugs (Britten, 1994; Britten et 
al., 2002; Giveon, 2004). Although concerns of 
naturalness are difficult to explain based on 
objective evidence, they might reflect people’s 
propensity to guard the purity of the body (Rozin et 
al., 2008; Schnall et al., 2008), and artificial 
substances appear to be perceived as more 
dangerous contaminants than natural substances. 
Indeed, so many people consume large amounts of 
coffee on a daily basis, presumably at least in part 
to become more cognitively alert, that coffee is the 
second most commonly traded commodity in the 
world, surpassed only by crude oil (Trade 
Commodities, 2011). Thus, mild cognitive 
enhancement derived from plant sources is very 
much part of daily life, but is usually not met with 
strong moral objection.  
Along similar lines, both studies made clear 
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that dosage form is a relevant moral concern. 
Participants regarded the administration of CE 
drugs via an injection to be more wrong than via a 
drink, in line with research on patient preferences 
for certain dosage forms (Atkinson et al., 2004; 
Fallowfield et al., 2006). One possible explanation 
for this finding is that injections, as opposed to 
dosage forms such as pills, may invoke disgust 
because they involve penetration of the body’s 
protective envelope, which is a violation of the 
purity ethic (Rozin et al., 2008). 
 Overall, the current findings point to the role 
of moral intuitions when deciding about the ethics 
of real-life dilemmas. They contribute to the 
ongoing debate about the place of CE drugs in 
society by comparing between academic discussion 
and moral attitudes in a student population—a 
segment of the population with much to gain or lose 
with changes in CE drug use policy. Some cognitive 
neuroscientists argue that “mentally competent 
adults should be able to engage in cognitive 
enhancement using drugs (Greely et al., 2008, p. 
703),” assuming the development of safe drugs, and 
appropriate laws to ensure fairness and minimize 
coercion. Indeed, we found that in our participants, 
health was a primary concern, and hence it is 
possible that the legalization of CE drugs with 
negligible side effects could be met with few ethical 
objections. However, we also found that several 
other concerns contributed in important ways to 
participants’ condemnation of CE drugs. Although 
some factors, such as naturalness or dosage form, 
might be considered objectively less relevant, the 
fact that they do matter to people warrants closer 
examination. Our findings illuminate the 
complexity of concerns – whether based on rational 
considerations, or on gut feelings and intuitions – 
that may need to be taken into account in public 
policy decisions regulating the use of CE drugs. 
Thus, our findings, together with the existing 
discussions in the media and in academic circles, 
suggest that the question of whether society should 
endorse or prohibit the development and use of 
drug-based methods of cognitive enhancement is a 
moral one, and is likely to continue to stir emotion, 
and controversy.  
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Footnotes 
1For the remainder of this paper, “CE drugs” and 
“CE drug use” refer to “CE drug use by healthy 
individuals.” 
2 We use the term “dosage form” to refer to both 
dosage form and route of administration. 
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Table 1 
Mean moral judgments for CE drug use concerns, Study 2 
      
 Mean SD   Mean SD 
Health 
No negative 
side-effects 4.00a 3.02  
Dosage form 
 
Additive to tea 
or coffee 4.72 a 2.84 
Temporary 
negative side-
effects 
5.44b 2.53  Pill 4.78 a 2.92 
Long-term 
negative side-
effects 
7.30ab 2.29  Injection 5.56 b 2.68 
Distributive 
Fairness 
Most people 
could afford 4.26 a 2.85  
Naturalness 
 
Organic whole 
foods store 4.80 a 2.95 
Some people 
could afford 5.90 b 2.47  Supermarket 4.56 a 2.92 
Only very few 
people could 
afford 
6.52 ab 2.25 
 
Pharmacies 4.50 a 2.87 
Competitive 
Fairness 
No others 
were taking in 
exam 
7.18 a 2.25 
Overall moral 
judgment  4.54 2.67 
Some others 
were taking in 
exam 
6.56 b 2.58      
Most others 
were taking in 
exam 
5.46 ab 2.71      
NOTE: N = 50 for each item. Scores ranged from 0 to 9, with the following intermittent labels: 0 
“perfectly OK”, 3 “somewhat wrong”, 6 “very wrong”, and 9 “extremely wrong”. Means with 
differing subscripts within the three items related to each concern differ significantly at the p < .05 
level, using pairwise Bonferroni comparisons. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Mean moral judgments for CE drug use concerns, Study 2 
 N Mean SD 
Health 
No negative side-effects 26 2.73a 1.69
Long-term negative side-
effects 26 3.81b 1.33
Distributive 
Fairness 
Only very few people 
could afford 26 3.58a 1.50
Most people could afford 26 3.19 a 1.70
NOTE: Scores ranged from 0 to 5, with the following endpoint 
labels: 0 "perfectly OK" and 5 "extremely wrong". Means with 
differing subscripts differed significantly at the p < .05 level.  
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Figure 1 
Mean moral judgments of competitive fairness and peer pressure, Study 2 
 
NOTE: Scores ranged from 0 to 5, with the following endpoint labels: 0 "perfectly OK" and 5 "extremely 
wrong". 
 
 
Figure 2 
Mean moral judgments of naturalness and dosage form, Study 2 
 
NOTE: Scores ranged from 0 to 5, with the following endpoint labels: 0 "perfectly OK" and 5 "extremely 
wrong". 
 
